Category Archives: SCOTUS

Gutting The Administrative Swamp Creatures

Oh, boy. Last week, we saw “CHEVRON deference” overturned, eliminating the ATF-abused procedure of requiring judges to take the agency’s word for it when they creatively reinterpret laws.

Today, the Supreme Court took it quite a bit further in CORNER POST. This is a case over debit card merchant transaction fees, so you wonder what it has to do with Second Amendment issues.

Everything. And the EPA is going to hate this, too. Here’s the background.

In 2021, Corner Post joined a suit brought against the Board under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint challenged Regulation II on the ground that it allows higher interchange fees than the statute permits. The District Court dismissed the suit as time-barred under 28 U. S. C. §2401(a), the default six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

The lower courts held that the statute of limitations clock started ticking the rule was published. An interesting take; imagine claiming that statute of limitations for robbery started running when the law was passed, rather than when the robbery took place.

That matters, because Corner Post didn’t exist when the transaction fee rule was published. Just like you might not have been born when the armed robbery law pass enacted. Corner post was injured when they opened for business and started accepting debit cards. That is when the statute of limitations starts counting down.

Held: An APA claim does not accrue for purposes of §2401(a)’s 6-year statute of limitations until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.

How does that apply to us and the ATF?

Until 1982, semi-auto firearms that fired from the open bolt were semi-autos. But that year, the ATF suddenly decided that open-bolt firearms are easily converted into machineguns, and thus are machineguns. Unless

To make it worse, it only applied to those models sold after the ruling, while those sold prior somehow remain semiautomatic. This forced complete redesigns on the manufacturers.

Here we have a rule that is arbitrary, capricious, and in conflict with the law defining “machinegun.”

The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.

“Restored,” not converted. It had to be a machinegun at some earlier point in its existence. But courts defer to the ATF’s re-definition, and send people to prison over semi-auto “machineguns.”

We got rid of that stupid deference last week. But it still looked like we were stuck with existing stupid, arbitrary, and capricious rules. No more.

Go out and buy one of those open-bolt SM10 machineguns. When you’re told to apply for your tax stamp, sue the ATF over the idiotic rule…

because you were just now injured by it. And have standing.

tick tick tick tick tick

Every swamp agency’s years-old rules are now ripe for challenging all over again, without deference. I saw a comment at SCOTUSblog to the effect that SCOTUS just guaranteed itself horrendously full dockets for next few years.

Good.

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CHEVRON Overturned

While this case, LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, was not about the Second Amendment, it’s still a big win for it.

Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled.

When SCOTUS tossed the ATF’s unconstitutional bump-stock ban, they called out the ATF for attempting to take the legislative power of Congress. I thought it was a good start, and I looked forward to the Loper Bright ruling.

This decision doesn’t specifically mention “Cheveron deference” (the idea that courts should defer to a federal agency’s interpretation of a law over that of the challenger), but they certainly did not give the ATF deference here. So that’s a good precedent for gun owners challenging other ATF abuses.

The ATF lives for CHEVRON deference. That’s how two copies of the exact same model of semiauto pistol could be a semiauto, while one assembled the very next day is a machinegun. Or 37 mm projectiles are either not destructive devices (loaded with a black powder pyrotechnic charge) or are destructive devices (loaded with a bean bag). Or the magical way Desert Eagle .50s became destructive devices when they changed the method of measuring the bore. Or…

Eh, just read that white paper for more.

For too long, the ATF has relied on Just take our word for it, Your Honor. No more; now they have to prove their psychotic re-interpretations really are Congressional intent. And presumed innocence returns.

On the downside, just as has happened post-BRUEN, it’s going to take a lot of effort to get lower courts to pay attention, and stop granting unconstitutional deference to unelected DC swampcrawlers.

I hope the good attorneys at the Firearms Policy Coalition take a look at this decision and that white paper, and see if they can right some very old wrongs.

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Repost: SCOTUS Tosses Bump Stock Ban

I originally posted this on my personal blog while TZP was down.


See updates below.


Big news this morning.

Supreme Court Strikes Down Bump Stock Ban
In a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) exceeded its authority when it issued a rule classifying firearms equipped with bump stocks as machine guns. The case, Garland v. Cargill, challenged the ban enacted following the 2017 Las Vegas concert mass shooting, which it implemented by interpreting a federal law restricting the transfer or possession of machine guns to include bump stocks.

It looks like Clarence Thomas wrote the majority decision, so I’ve got some reading to do. I always enjoy Thomas’ decisions.

It looks like this is primarily based on violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. I tried to tell the ATF just that in my NPRM comments.

I expect I’ll have more on this after I finish reading the decision.

UPDATE: Yes, the ATF violated the APA by exceeding its authority.

Held: ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under §5845(b).

But, Thomas didn’t stop there.

A semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock does not fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” The phrase “function of the trigger” refers to the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism.

A clear, unequivocal, specific ruling that, not only did they exceed their authority, but that bump stocks do not turn firearms into machineguns. As I told them.

In fact, one might almost suspect that Justice Thomas read my NPRM comments. Or maybe my blog.

ATF argues that a shooter using a bump stock must pull the trigger only one time to initiate a bump-firing sequence of multiple shots. This initial trigger pull sets off a sequence—fire, recoil, bump, fire—that allows the weapon to continue firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. This argument rests on the mistaken premise that there is a difference between the shooter flexing his finger to pull the trigger and pushing the firearm forward to bump the trigger against his stationary trigger.

The law address function of the trigger, not function of the finger. And the off-arm movement needed to make the finger re-engage the trigger is volitional, not an “automatic” function of the firearm.

Thomas included pictures for idiots. But apparently he should have drawn them in crayon for the real morons on the bench.

The dimwitted dissenting Justices — Kagan, Sotomayer, Jackson; go figure — were reduced to this: The ATF says they’re machineguns, therefore…

When I see a bird that walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck. A bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle fires “automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.

Those are the words of overly-emotive panty-pissers incapable of logic.

Added: This decision doesn’t specifically mention “Cheveron deference” (the idea that courts should defer to a federal agency’s interpretation of a law over that of the challenger), but they certainly did not give the ATF deference here. So that’s a good precedent for gun owners challenging other ATF abuses.

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RAHIMI vs. Red Flags

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI is in the news with a Supreme Court ruling a few days ago. And the victim disarmament crowd is all over it.

You see, SCOTUS found that someone never convicted of a crime can still lose his Second Amendment rights via a domestic violent prevention order. Associate Justice Thomas dissented. For very good reasons.

Michigan’s Attorney General is one of the people eyeing this ruling with glee.

Nessel says SCOTUS gun ruling confirms constitutionality of Michigan gun laws
“Michigan’s recently passed ERPO [extreme risk protection order] law was modeled after the federal law at issue in the Rahimi case, and the Supreme Court’s decision today only confirms the constitutionality of our own law.”

Not so fast, statist thug.

Rahimi was charged with unlawful firearm possession under 18 U.S. Code § 922(g)(8). An important part of that is this:

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;

That’s a problem with Michigan’s ERPO law (“red flag”). Michigan’s law allows ex parte proceedings in which the accused does not receive “actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.”

So, no, RAHIMI does not support your unconstitutional “red flag” law.

A lower court had dismissed the charge against Rahimi, based on the BRUEN test of general, historical legal tradition; the court found no early laws analogous to firearm possession bans via protective order. But — compromised? — Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, claims to have found not one, but two such laws.

By the 1700s and early 1800s, though, two distinct legal regimes had developed that specifically addressed firearms violence: the surety laws and the “going armed” laws. Surety laws were a form of “preventive justice,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 251 (10th ed. 1787), which authorized magistrates to require individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond
[…]
Surety laws could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including spousal abuse, and also targeted the misuse of firearms.

Can you spot the subtle difference between a surety bond to prevent a person performing an actual violent act, and a protective order that bans possession of a tool regardless of whether it was used?

Dolly-influenced(?) Roberts couldn’t.

His other example law similarly misses the mark.

The “going armed” laws—a particular subset of the ancient common law prohibition on affrays, or fighting in public provided a mechanism for punishing those who had menaced others with firearms. Under these laws, individuals were prohibited from “riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the good people of the land.”

The “going armed” laws were specific to threatening and menacing actions using guns (and other weapons), not the simple possession of those implements.

Roberts missed it by this ……………….. […] ………………….. much. I’m not sure how he missed it, since I figured it out two years ago. Yes, I examined historical surety bonds and such in this very light. Maybe the Fifth Circuit read it, even if Roberts didn’t.

Thomas, dissenting, gets it right, as usual.

To trigger §922(g)(8)’s prohibition, a restraining must bear three characteristics. First, the order issues after a hearing where the accused “received actual notice” and had “an opportunity to participate.”

No ex parte proceedings allowed.

Just as important as §922(g)(8)’s express terms is what it leaves unsaid. Section 922(g)(8) does not require a finding that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic violence. It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a person’s criminal history, unlike other §922(g) subsections.

And Thomas correctly notes that this is a deprivation of rights not triggered by a criminal conviction. Plus…

In addition, §922(g)(8) strips an individual of his ability to possess firearms and ammunition without any due process. Rather, the ban is an automatic, uncontestable consequence of certain orders.

The bans firearm possession, not just threatening or menacing actions. Sometimes it’s like Thomas reads my work as much as I read his. (That’s a joke; I’d be dumbfounded if Thomas knows who I am even if prompted with my name.)

And what does Clarence Thomas think of Roberts’ surety laws argument?

Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. First, it targets conduct at the core of the Second Amendment— possessing firearms. Second, the Government failed to produce any evidence that §922(g)(8) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. To the contrary, the founding generation addressed the same societal problem as §922(g)(8) through the “materially different means” of surety laws.

Aha! the outright ban on mere constitutionally protected possession is not analogous, it is a “materially different means.”

Thomas notes that even the prosecution didn’t try to present surety and going armed laws as analagous to 8 U.S. Code § 922(g)(8).

Despite canvassing laws before, during, and after our Nation’s founding, the Government does not identify even a single regulation with an analogous burden and justification.

The Government couldn’t come up with even one, so Roberts invented one for them.

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The Ninth Circuit Did WHAT?

This is not the sort of headline I expect to see coming out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Ninth Circuit: Felon Has ‘Right to Possess Firearm for Self-Defense’
On Thursday a three-judge panel from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that Steven Duarte, a felon, has a “right to possess a firearm for self-defense.”

That opening sentence explains much: a three judge (2 Dubya appointees, and a Trump appointee) panel, not en banc. I’ve no doubt that the state is preparing a motion for en banc review.

The decision, United States v. Duarte, is here. The majority based  this ruling on BRUEN, with a dash of HELLER: there is no national “historical tradition of” barring felons who have completed their sentences from possessing firearms. Some readers may recall that such a bar never existed until the Gun Control Act of 1968, less than 50 years ago.

Almost two years ago, I pointed out that, “Much of the GCA ’68 is on very thin ice.”

The dissent, by Dubya appointee Judge Milan Smith Jr., is interesting in a morbid way.

The Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), did not overrule Vongxay. Instead, Bruen reiterates that the Second Amendment right belongs only to law-abiding citizens.

That’s a two-fer. First, the referenced Vongxay is a 2010 Ninth Circuit opinion. Smith is asserting that d 2022 BRUEN, by the lowly Supreme Court of the United States — you know; that one above the Ninth — does not override the majestic Ninth’s precedent. His rationale is that BRUEN didn’t specifically mention and overturn Vongxay by name.

Mommy! Timmy won’t stop poking me!</i?

Stop poking your sister, Timmy.

Mommy, he’s poking me again!

Timmy! I told you stop that!

But that was when I poked her with my index finger. You didn’t say I couldn’t use my middle finger, Mama.

Second, BRUEN does not reiterate “that the Second Amendment right belongs only to law-abiding citizens.” On the contrary, in BRUEN Associate Justice Breyer, in his dissent admitted:

Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to bear arms simply because of their status as felons.

BRUEN determined that law-abiding people do have Second Amendment protected rights, but it does not specifically exclude convicted felons who have completed their sentences, and presumptively reformed and now law-abiding people, whom it’s also presumptively safe to let walk our streets.

Rather like recognizing the right of a convicted felon, who has completed his sentence, to vote.

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This Is Why My Confidence In The Courts Is Bottoming Out

The Supreme Court today heard oral arguments in Cargill v. Garland, the challenge to Trump’s (yeah, he still owns it) bump-stock ban.

Now, it’s true that we still have Clarence Thomas, who is intelligent and willing to study facts at issue. But we also have Associate Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson.

“And when, you know, ‘function’ is defined, it’s really not about the operation of the thing. It’s about what it can achieve, what it’s being used for. So I see Congress as putting function in this. The function of this trigger is to cause this kind of damage, 800 rounds a second or whatever.”

That was after the government claimed that a semiauto rifle with a bump-stock can fire 600 rounds per minute. But Brown, with firearm knowledge exceeding that of John Moses Browning, knows better: 800 rounds per second.

Probably theoretically, higher, once you account for those magazine changes in that one second.

Just for comparison, the GAU-8/A Avenger seven-barreled, Gatling-style autocannon in the A-10 attack aircraft — the beloved “Warthog” — has a measly rate of fire of just 3,900 rounds per minute; twelve times slower that Jackson’s magical bump-stocked gun.

No wonder the Air Force wants to retire the A-10.

But back to bitter reality. We’re stuck with ignorant high court judges, who when even the banners inflated claims fall short, simply make up their own “facts” to rationalize the infringement of allegedly protected rights.

Oh, well; however SCOTUS rules, Thomas’ takedown of Jackson’s idiocy should be amusing.

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Post Office Gun Ban Struck Down

Federal Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle, of the Middle District of Florida, ruled that the ban on firearm possession in post offices is unconstitutional, in US v. Ayala. She cites the BRUEN test of general, historical legal tradition.

Mizelle gave the government multiple chances to present some evidence of such historical tradition. The best they could do?

the United States fails to point to sufficient historical evidence supporting § 930(a)’s application here. (providing only two paragraphs listing potential historical analogues without any analysis of how they are relevantly similar).

Mizelle herself did much more. Using USPS documents, she demonstrated that there has been a longstanding tradition of mail robberies and assaults; in a postal system itself of longstanding — pre-Revolutionary War — tradition. Yet never, until 1964 were firearms banned from any federal facility. The first specific post office gun ban was 1972. 18 U.S. Code § 930, the law under which Defendant Ayala was charged, didn’t come about until just 1988.

Mizelle took the government on a tour through American history, giving specific examples of the post office allowing clerks to arm themselves, and (again citing a USPS reference) “the Postmaster General armed railway mail clerks with “government-issued pistols” from World War I.” (emphasis in the original)

This is a lady who clearly read and understood Associate Justice Clarence Thomas’ BRUEN decision. In fact, in a conversation I mentioned that this decision reads like she was a Thomas protégé. Which prompted me to look up Judge Mizelle

She clerked for Clarence Thomas. I think he can be proud.

By the way, for those interested, Mizelle was the same federal judge who struck down the fed ChinCOVID mask mandates.

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Precedent Can Be Dangerous

Or even really dangerous, in the wrong hands.

For years, I’ve warned about the dangers of precedents; in laws, bureaucratic regulation, and judicial. My personal ball got rolling back inthe 1990s with the passage of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. CALEA was passed to “help” LE catch criminals, by making it easier to tap phone calls.

The Communications Assistance for law Enforcement Act (CALEA) is a statute enacted by Congress in 1994 to require that telecommunications carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they have the necessary surveillance capabilities to comply with legal requests for information. CALEA is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance while protecting the privacy of information outside the scope of the investigation.

Sure. But it morphed into requiring the capability to monitor 10% of switch traffic at the same time; ten percent of all phones in the country. And remotely, so LE doesn’t even have to come to the switch office and physically tap a single line. It was expanded to include Internet traffic.

Then the PATRIOT Act to help catch terrorists.

What could possibly go wrong? Who could have foreseen that someone later would use those tools to monitor thousands of innocent Americans, or even spy on the opposition’s election campaign?

Well… “Who,” other than myself and thousands of other privacy advocates.

The Colorado Supreme Court just gave us a real doozy of a precedent: it just declared Donald Trump to be an “insurrectionist” ineligible to appear on the state primary ballot.

Love Trump or hate him (and I’m no great fan), the “reasoning” and “process” behind this decision is frightening; enough so that I’ll never travel to or through Colorado again.

The CO supreme court majority (there are three dissenters with some self-awareness) simply declared Trump to be guilty of insurrection. They deliberately and specifically denied the need for an actual charge of 18 U.S.C. § 2383 insurrection, a trial, evidence, or conviction. They specifically denied any requirement for Fifth Amendment due process. The accusation — in a civil case that Trump was not a party to — is all it takes for a life sentence of ineligibility to hold office or appear on a ballot.

Because Amendment 14, Section 3 is magically “self-executing.”

There is no Fifth Amendment in Colorado.

If this were to go to the US Supreme Court (and Trump says he’ll appeal), we might well learn there is no Fifth Amendment in the country.

But let’s look at the flip side of this insane precedent, under the almost-worst case scenario*:

Imagine down the road we end up with a hard-core right-wing administration; a Republican president perhaps, with as little respect for the whole Constitution as many current Republicans (don’t forget who saddled us with CALEA, PATRIOT, and bump-stock bans in the first place). Let’s say President Smith ran on a platform plank of doing something about the ATF, winning hearts and minds of American gun owners.

On the one hand, we have an agency whose specific job is to infringe on Second Amendment rights.

On the other hand, we have a precedent that says Constitutional amendments are automatically “self-executing,” and punishments for violation of the 2A don’t require indictment, trial, evidence, facing accusers, or defense. And one day, President Smith Tyrant simply send US Marshals to every ATF office in the country to round up every agent and employee, and drag their sorry asses off to the gulags, never to be heard from again.

Or… Federal Election Commission, meet the self-executing First Amendment.

You can probably think of one or two others that could use a dose of Constitutional self-execution.

So to speak.


* The worst case scenario would be SCOTUS making this a national precedent with the current administration, which proceed to rape the country faster and harder than it already is.

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I Expect Clarence Thomas Is Fuming Right About Now

Because a three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals just upheld, 2-1, Illinois’ “assault weapon” ban in Bevis v. Naperville (which is actually six separate challenges to “assault weapon” bans in Illinois, consolidated), and mangled BRUEN in the process. To do this, the lying bastards started with the BS “weapons of war” argument. And went downhill from there.

Honestly, this decision reads like something you might expect from the Ninth Circuit.

We find substantial support for the proposition that the Arms protected by the Second Amendment do not include weapons that may be reserved for military use.

Because obviously AR-15s are just like “a nuclear weapon such as the now-retired M388 Davy Crockett system, with its 51-pound W54 warhead.” Seriously; they equated semi-auto rifles to nuclear warheads.

And to support that position, Easterbrook and Wood lied about Supreme Court rulings, starting with MILLER, 1939 which said exactly the opposite. This Court resorts to citing the dissent to magically turn military use into common, lawful civilian use, and pretends HELLER said that.

But after Heller, we know Miller does not address a weapon’s military use. Because the National Firearms Act of 1934 targeted the firearms most commonly used by criminals and gangs, Miller’s “lawful use” language relates to criminal use, not military use.

The term “lawful use” doesn’t even appear in MILLER. It had no “lawful use” test. It only used a militia use test:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.

HELLER addressed civilian use of weapons not specifically acknowledged as militarily useful, and asked if possession of those by civilians could be banned. The court concluded that civilian weapons in common, lawful use could not be banned; that there is an individual right to them. And that the right to those not necessarily military-style weapons was subject to reasonable limits.

HELLER didn’t overturn MILLER; it built on it, and added to it. Those judges damned well know what MILLER and HELLER really said. The fact that they twist the words, and outright lie, about them proves their intent was not innocent.

Now that Easterbrook and Wood have pretended that “weapons of war” aren’t 2A-protected, they have to “establish” that AR-15s are military weapons.

Coming directly to the question whether the weapons and feeding devices covered by the challenged legislation enjoy Second Amendment protection, at the first step of the Bruen analysis, we conclude that the answer is no. We come to this conclusion because these assault weapons and high-capacity magazines are much more like machineguns and military-grade weaponry than they are like the many different types of firearms that are used for individual self-defense (or so the legislature was entitled to conclude).8 Indeed, the AR-15 is almost the same gun as the M16 machinegun.

How do they know?

The only meaningful distinction, as we already have noted, is that the AR-15 has only semiautomatic capability (unless the user takes advantage of some simple modifications that essentially make it fully automatic), while the M16 operates both ways.

Sure, an illegally modified AR-15 is is the same thing as an M16, just illegally mounting a 120mm cannon on a Trabant makes it an Abrams M1A1 Main Battle Tank.

Speaking — currently — illegal modifications, these jokers used a timely example.

The similarity between the AR-15 and the M16 only increases when we take into account how easy it is to modify the AR-15 by adding a “bump stock” (as the shooter in the 2017 Las Vegas event had done) or auto-sear to it, thereby making it, in essence, a fully automatic weapon.

Personally, I would have skipped that one, since the same day they issued this ruling, SCOTUS — facing a multi-Circuit split on the bump-stock ban — granted cert to Garland v. Cargill, challenging the ban.

So… they’ve lied their way into declaring that the 2A doesn’t protect “weapons of war,” and that AR-15s are in that class. Now they also had to deal with BRUEN‘s general, historical legal tradition test, which they handled with still more verbal manipulation and selective editing.

The analysis then moves to second step, which calls on the “government [to] justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. The Court predicted that this second step would be relatively easy in some instances, when historical analogues are easy to find. But in other instances, it recognized that the task would be challenging. It singled out “cases implicating unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes,” which “may require a more nuanced approach.”

These two would have you believe that if something is new enough, then general, historical legal traditions don’t apply. But what they left out from BRUEN is this part.

Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it.

Yes, the Constitution and the Second Amendment still apply to “new” things like the five decades-old design of the AR-15. Some restrictions on how they are used might be constitutional, but a ban isn’t.

As for “dramatic technological changes” that those early folks could never imagine

James Madison, known for his role in drafting the Bill of Rights (including that pesky 2A) lived through the rise of repeating firearms, breechloaders, paper cartridges, percussion caps, metallic cartridges, pinfire cartridges, centerfire cartridges, revolvers, and mass production of firearms.

Heck, an early machinegun was pitched to the US War Office in 1812, and patented in 1813 — during Madison’s presidency (and was a refinement of a 16th century machinegun).

Yet never once did Madison stop and say, “Whoa, guys! We didn’t have any of this new shit in mind. The Second Amendment is just for muskets.”

Speaking of “patented”, not only could the Founders envision dramatic technological changes, they counted on it and deliberately promoted it.

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

Yes, liars, the BRUEN test applies to AR-15s. And I challenge you to provide a citation of the nation’s general, historical legal tradition of banning civilian possession of “weapons of war.” Bear in mind you’ll have to explain away another pesky provision of the Constitution.

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

In case the judges are unfamiliar with Letters of Marque pay attention, too):

Letter of marque, the name given to the commission issued by a belligerent state to a private shipowner authorizing him to employ his vessel as a ship of war. A ship so used is termed a privateer.

Not only was civilian ownership of real weapons of war not banned, they — again — counted on it. Muskets, rifles, cannon, warships; all of them. Moreso, in the case of muskets or rifles, they required private possession of those “weapons of war.”

Granted, these robed morons did cite some legal “traditions” that they would have you believe support a ban on an entire arbitrary class of firearms. But what they came up with were a series of local ordinances barring discharge of muskets and cannon in town, some isolated bans on Bowie knives, or openly carrying certain types of firearms.

They couldn’t find anything in relevant history of a general nature; and remember that BRUEN specifies that isolated local laws don’t count:

The bare existence of these localized restrictions cannot overcome the overwhelming evidence of an otherwise enduring American tradition permitting public carry.

There’s nothing of a general law citation until the National Firearms Act of 1934, 143 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment. So my challenge stands.

The third member of the panel, Judge Brennan sanely dissented with his crazed colleagues. While he also addressed procedural issues with the passage of the state ban, he hit on the issues I’ve covered; albeit more formally and politely. Like me, he took issue with Easterbrook and Wood’s mangling and misinterpretations of HELLER and BRUEN. He also objected their “It’s military, so it isn’t protected” position: arms are arms, they’re all protected; some can be regulated but not banned.

I liked this bit that Brennan included, about the whole scary “AR-15s are weapons of war” thing:

The AR-15 is a civilian, not military, weapon. No army in the world uses a service rifle that is only semiautomatic.

That’s a point I’ve been raising for years. None do; the last country I found using them switched to select-fire assault rifles three decades ago.

All in all, I look forward to this being appealed to SCOTUS. I’m sure Clarence Thomas will insist the Court take this up, just so he can judicially bitch-slap Easterbrook and Wood for shredding BRUEN and HELLER.

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A Mass Shooting Solution?

I ran across a peculiar column last week, but I held off commenting on it.

Mass Shootings: If No One Else Will Offer a Solution, I Will
While everyone is screaming to ban “weapons of war” or whatever the ridiculous phrase du jour is, nobody is offering any kind of solution. We keep saying we need to “have real conversations about mental health,” but we never do. So if we’re not going to ban firearms or have a kumbaya drum circle for mental health, and if no one else is going to offer a solution, I will.

That’s right, yours truly has a policy idea that might move us in the right direction. Because I am going out on a limb here, I’ll go ahead and say that I welcome other ideas, influences, and perspectives. All I ask is that we keep the disagreements civil when we comment down below. Lastly, I use the word “firearm” to cover any weapon that relies on a firing pin, as well as ammunition with a percussion primer. With this definition, make, model, or capacity does not matter.

The reason I held back is this proposal confused the heck out me. It appears at PJ Media, which is a fairly conservative outlet with — usually — a firm grounding in the Constitution and reality. Ashley McCully appears to be a regular contributor.

By McCully’s proposal is anything but Constitution- and reality-based. Before I tore her a figurative new one, I considered the possibiltiy that this is satire. The law she proposes reads like a far-left Dimocrat wishlist; it’s a thoroughly impractical, immoral, and unconstitutional rape of rights.

On the other hand we have the column’s URL: a-modest-proposal-to-prevent-mass-shootings-and-preserve-gun-rights-n1738194

That certainly hearkens back to the very model of literary satire. But was she writing satire, or did an editor pick that URL to poke fun at her “serious” proposal?

I attempted to contact her, but heard nothing for days. So I’m going assume that she meant what she said.

Here goes.

Regardless of how the firearm is purchased, gifted, bequeathed, or obtained, the individual taking receipt of the firearm must present a written statement from a licensed mental health professional endorsing the requesting individual as mentally stable and competent enough to possess a firearm.

That’s an interesting take on the Second Amendment, apparently now reading A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people who have been medically approved to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Up yours, Ashley. And you might want to run your idea past Clarence Thomas, because that requirement is a massive fail on the BRUEN test of “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

She’d be hard pressed to find and such law in our national tradition, seeing as how the very field of “psychology” didn’t exist until 1854, and didn’t get rolling in the United States until around 1875. And medical licensing? That wasn’t really a thing until the 1870s. And the first actually restrictive medical licensing law was passed in 1881, and only upheld by the Supreme Court in 1889.

In the event an individual is deemed mentally unstable and/or incompetent to possess a firearm by a licensed health professional, then it will also be deemed reasonable to search any and all property of the individual by law enforcement for the sole purpose of identifying and seizing deadly weapons, to include firearms. The written diagnosis by a licensed mental health professional will be declared suitable for probable cause for a warrant to be issued.

There are a couple of problems here. Begging permission to obtain a firearm, and failing to get that permission, is probable cause to ransack a home for the firearm he didn’t get?!

And currently, it would be a HIPAA violation for that licensed mental health professional to voluntarily forward that personal health information, the diagnosis, to the cops. You’ll need to amend 45 CFR 164.512(f)(1)(i)), too, Ashely.

But that’s moot; because no sane mental health pro is going to issue certification.

If the requesting individual commits any crime with a firearm, the license of the endorsing mental health professional will be suspended throughout the criminal investigation. If the requesting individual is found guilty of any crime with a firearm, then the endorsing mental health professional may lose their license permanently and may be subject to criminal charges.

Note the lack of specification of time frame or what firearm is used. If someone gets a gun, lives peacefully for 30 years, then sudden decides to unlawfully pull a trigger — maybe of a gun that some other doc signed off on — the original doc loses his license and goes to jail. Both, in fact. What doctor is going to assume that perpetual liability? Since it would effectively be impossible to get approval, this effectively bans private ownership of firearms.

Speaking of liability…

Regardless of relationship, if a firearm is used to commit any crime by any person, the registered owner of that firearm will be held criminally liable.

If I jump through McCully’s hoops and get a gun, I would be criminally liable if a burglar broke into my house, shot me, tore my gun safe out of the floor, ripped it open with a plasma cutter, took one of my guns, and used it to rob someone else. Ashley’s liability language makes no exception.

Up yours with a prickly pear, Ashley.

Oh, and did you notice that “registered owner” bit? Yep, her wanna-be law presupposes registration. Language in other parts make it clear that the registry she so blithely assumes would include currently owned firearms, not just those bought under her new police state process.

I’m going to guess, like Hollywood writers who have cops checking gun registrations in southern states, McCully lives in a state that does have registration and stupidly assumes everyone else does, too.

Hint, Ashley: most of the country does not register firearms and owners. And in some states, Georgia and Florida for example, creating a registry is serious felony.

I’m skipping some other — mostly liability — points, and going straight to the finale. Which either solidly establishes this as satire, or Ashley as bug-f##k nuts.

Anyone connected to an individual who has been deemed mentally unstable and/or incompetent enough to possess a firearm and has had at least one firearm or deadly weapon seized by the State under Title II, including but not limited to family, friends, colleagues, roommates, associates, or acquaintances, must provide a secondary verbal and written affirmation that they will be held criminally liable for any crime committed by anyone involving the firearms for which they are registered owners.

You may need to read that a couple of time to parse it out.

If you know someone in passing — a neighbor down the street with whom you exchange greetings — that is a prohibited person for mental reasons…

…even if you don’t know it…

you must swear verbally and in writing (redundant, that) that you will be held criminally liable if said acquaintance… well, see the earlier burglary/plasma cutter scenario.

Ashley’s proposal doesn’t include any mechanism for identifying and contacting the prohibited person’s family, friends, colleagues, roommates, associates, or acquaintances, or anyone “connected to” and sharing their personal legal and medical history. So I’ll be damned if I know how you’re supposed to know to make that “affirmation,” much less to whom.

I would really prefer that is satire, but the fact that McCully wouldn’t respond doesn’t look good.

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