Category Archives: SCOTUS

Turning BRUEN On Its Head

The Firearms Policy Coalition and the Second Amendment Foundation are suing Washington over its “high capacity” (10+ rounds) magazine ban. That’s old news in itself. What is new is that the Aliiance for Gun Responsibility joined the case as “intervenor-defendant.”

Yes, someone petitioned the court to be sued. Odd, but not unprecedented. More often if someone thinks they have valid points to bring to the court’s attention they would file an amicus brief. But actually being a party to the case gives them more leeway to file motions and responses and potentially call more witnesses.

But I couldn’t help wondering exactly what the AGR, the primary backers of the ban, expected to bring before the court that the existing governmental defendants couldn’t or wouldn’t.

The Alliance specifically denies Paragraph 38’s assertion that LCM regulations are “recent phenomena.”
[…]
The Alliance specifically denies Paragraph 39’s assertion or suggestion that LCMs have been common in America (or anywhere else in the world) for hundreds of years.

Wait. What? Large capacity magazines aren’t recent but have been around for quite a while, but they haven’t been around for quite a while? They regulated something that hadn’t been around?

The Alliance admits that, to the extent weapons capable of firing more than ten rounds existed before the 20th century, they were experimental, unusual, impractical, unreliable, prohibitively expensive, or otherwise not analogous to modern firearms equipped with LCMs—and thus unlikely to necessitate government regulation. The Alliance admits that the only known example in existence of the Wheellock rifle was made in Germany around 1580 and was capable of firing 16 shots.

Basically, we are looking at a –admittedly confused — variation of the old “the founders never envisioned anything but single-shot muskets” argument. Buy with a weird twist to account for the ruling in BRUEN.

The Alliance admits that, to the extent weapons capable of firing more than ten rounds existed before the 20th century, they were experimental, unusual, impractical, unreliable, prohibitively expensive, or otherwise not analogous to modern firearms equipped with LCMs— and thus unlikely to necessitate government regulation.

BRUEN requires that gun control laws and regulations have a basis in general, historical tradition.

The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies today requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding. Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in 1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the understandings of those who ratified it.

AGR is arguing that specific firearms — innovations — have a basis in such tradition, or they can by default be regulated. AGR’s attorney, Kai Smith, just got BRUEN completely ass-backwards.

Never mind that SCOTUS disposed of that very argument in BRUEN. Or, for that matter, in the earlier Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016)

the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding”

AGR would have us — and specifically the court — believe that the only reason that the government didn’t “envision” magazine limits was that they didn’t envision “high capacity” magazines. And of course if they’d anticipated that, they would have preemptively banned such Progress of Science and useful Arts”.

Instead of promoting innovation.

Pro-tip, AGR: Just because Madison didn’t invent “high capacity” magazine-fed semi-automatic firearms does not mean he didn’t anticipate such a possibility.

James Madison, known for his role in drafting the Bill of Rights (including that pesky 2A) lived through the rise of repeating firearms, breechloaders, paper cartridges, percussion caps, metallic cartridges, pinfire cartridges, centerfire cartridges, revolvers, and mass production of firearms.
[…]
Yet never once did Madison stop and say, “Whoa, guys! We didn’t have any of this new shit in mind. The Second Amendment is just for muskets.”

It’s almost as if they foresaw “Progress of Science and useful Arts” — including arms. And communications systems. You might even get the impression they sought to “promote” such advancements by “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”

This — aside from the lack of a law degree — is why I’ll never be a federal judge. I’d have sanctioned attorney Kai Smith for that frivolous, self-contradictory filing that completely reverses the meaning of two separate Supreme Court rulings.

 

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Defending the Constitution by Endorsing its Enemies?

How can one defend Constitutional integrity by endorsing the view of its enemies? How can one defend its meaning if ignorant of that meaning? The former is akin to an attorney telling the jury every word uttered by prosecutors with respect to his client’s guilt is true, but, find him not guilty anyway. The latter would be like a football team taking the field having spent zero time studying and learning their plays. Both are doomed to failure.

Chris Stigall is a conservative radio talk show host out in Kansas City, Missouri. The Pacific Legal Foundation, headquartered in Sacramento, California, is a conservative nonprofit defending American’s individual and property rights in Court against abuse by the federal government. I was able to pick up the Stigall Show on Monday 3 October 2022. He was interviewing an attorney for Pacific Legal about a pending case. During the discussion, she said, and Stigall agreed, under the Commerce Clause, the federal government has the authority to regulate anything that crosses state lines. Both are profoundly wrong. Prior to penning this refutation, I attempted to contact Stigall through several channels including his station manager, without success. That conservatives are ignorant of the Constitution to the point of endorsing interpretations counter to its meaning, is testament to public education’s success in teaching an imposter. The talk show host and attorney’s error possibly stem from a misapprehension with respect to America’s form of government, nature of delegated powers, state’s reserved powers, and meaning of the Commerce Clause.

America has a federal not national form of government. Although these terms are used interchangeably by teachers, they are, in fact, not at all the same. Under a national system, all power is consolidated in a central government and states comprise its regional subdivisions and have little or no autonomy. The central government makes all laws and applies them to states irrespective of local interests.1 America has a federal system in which States created the general government and delegated to it finite powers. Its authority is limited to international relations, foreign trade, war, copyrights, and standardization of currency, weights and measures, and a postal system. States are not political subdivisions of the general government but retain independent authority within their boundaries.2 They also have the right to take back powers they delegated to the federal government.3 States reserved all powers to themselves over domestic affairs. Federal and state power operate in separate autonomous spheres. Like trains, they run on parallel but separate tracks that do not intersect.4 States enumerated the federal government’s 18 powers in Article 1, Section 8. Any power not delegated is a power denied to the federal government. State’s exclusive authority over non-delegated powers is codified in the Tenth Amendment.5

The federal government may exercise only its enumerated powers and may not create implied from explicit ones. It may acquire new or expanded powers only through the amendment process. Only states may amend the Constitution. It cannot be amended by any branch of the federal government through interpretation. It may not make national laws as those operate on and within states which would violate the 10th Amendment. How does this relate to the Commerce Clause?

The Clause reads;

“The Congress shall have Power: To regulate commerce with foreign Nations,

and among the several States, with the Indian Tribes” [capitalization in the

original].6

Through the Declaration of Independence (1776), Articles of Confederation (1781), and Treaty of Paris (1783), Britain’s 13 former North American colonies declared they were independent sovereign states (nations) and recognized as such by Great Britain and the world. Each possessed an autonomous government and constitution. To raise revenue and protect native industry and agriculture, states erected tariffs and tolls on goods crossing their borders, by land, sea, and river, from other states. They also disputed the boundaries of western lands won through the war.7 In addition, they made separate trade treaties with foreign powers without regard to whether or not it harmed the interests of other states.

For example, under its colonial charter, Maryland controlled the Potomac River right to Virginia’s shoreline. Both used this river to ship upstate and western goods to the coast. To gain access to the river, Virginia successfully negotiated a trade treaty with Maryland. James Madison and others believed similar arrangements might be expanded to include the other eleven states. This might unify them and lead to settlement of western land claims. They called for a Convention to meet in Annapolis, 1785. Some states sent delegates, some arrived too late, and others boycotted. Congress called for a second convention to meet in Philadelphia.8 They met from May through September, 1787, debating and working out a constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation. They faced many challenges. Chief among them were trade disputes.

If states created a trade system benefitting all and disadvantaging none, it would diffuse interstate conflicts and bolster their economic strength vis a vis Britain and Europe. A clause eliminating interstate barriers to trade and commerce was the solution. In time, this policy would transform the United States into the “largest area of free trade in the world”. The Commerce Clause would put an end to “mercantilistic systems” of trade.9

John Taylor, perhaps the most towering intellect of the Founding period, noted the power to regulate commerce states delegated to the federal government served two purposes, “to prevent foreign nations from obtaining unjust advantages over the United States” and “to prevent one state from making another tributary to itself”.10 However, and this is crucial, the Commerce Clause delegates to Congress power to regulate trade between the U.S. and three forms of “sovereign entities; the States, foreign nations, and the Indian Tribes”.11 This refers to trade arrangements. It does not grant Congress power over commercial activities in or between states.12 The Commerce Clause’s purpose is to create one voice with respect to foreign trade and to facilitate free trade between states. How is the latter accomplished? By eliminating interstate tariffs and tolls not to erect rules governing commercial activity within and or crossing state lines.

In Federalist 42, James Madison explained the Commerce Clause only delegated to the federal government authority over international trade but not over the commercial activities within states or crossing their borders.13 Under this clause, the federal government makes trade treaties with foreign nations. To argue it empowers a federal government to make national laws governing commercial activities within states is nonsensical. States created the federal government. Did they assign it the function of making trade treaties between it and individual states? Of course not, because states are not foreign nations and commercial activities fall under state’s reserved powers. For example, the federal government may make trade treaties with Indian tribes but it has no authority to make rules governing the manufacture and sale of goods by Indians or sold to non-Indians. It is crucial to keep in mind that commercial activities and trade are not the same.14

The federal government has no authority to make rules governing the manufacture and sale of goods, working conditions, wages, or rules for transportation by air, boat, train or truck, private or public, inter or intrastate. These are functions of state governments.15

Madison noted delegates to the federal convention used the term commerce 34 times during debate and discussion typically in reference to trade with foreign nations. They used the terms commerce and trade interchangeably. This was true for the 63 times authors of the Federalist Papers [Hamilton, Madison, and Jay] used the terms. No delegate to the federal and subsequent state ratifying conventions, used these terms to mean other than trade.16

In Federalist 45, Madison wrote;

“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government

are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are

numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external

objects as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the

power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to

the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of

affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal

order, improvement and prosperity of the State”.17

What about the word “regulate”? Does it not mean the federal government has authority to control commercial activity? Does not control necessarily imply authority to make rules governing such activities in states, especially if it crosses state lines?

Fortunately, we have a treasure trove of documents from the framers. They demonstrate the common usage of the word “regulate” with respect to the Commerce Clause did not mean authority to make rules governing commercial activity. On the contrary, it means “to keep moving” to make regular. The Clause’s purpose is to keep trade moving by, as noted, eliminating interstate tariffs and tolls. The federal government’s power is reactive. It may remove barriers to interstate trade but may make no rules governing commercial activity.

Article 1, section 9, clause 6 states;

“No preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue, to the

ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels to or from one State, be

obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another [capitalization in the original].18

The Article is clear, Congress’s commerce power is to eliminate specific trade policies, employed by states, favoring their domestic industries and commercial activities at the expense of sister states.

Comparing the Constitution’s sections on commerce, with the dictionary extant at the time [1785 edition of Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language], it is clear commerce is defined as trade not the manufacture and sale of goods or any other gainful activity. This includes all phases of agricultural production and trade between individuals.19 Hence, the federal government has zero authority to make national laws governing the economic activities of private individuals, companies, or states within or crossing state borders.

Vice President John C. Calhoun, regrettably binned by modernity over his views on slavery, was correct in observing regulation of commerce applies to relations between the United States and foreign nations. Congress cannot “regulate” commercial activities within or between states because such power belongs only to a national form of government and the United States is constituted a federal republic. Calhoun noted the only time the clause would empower the federal government in relations with states would be if one chose to erect tariffs on goods from other states.20

University Professor of Law and Government, Randy E. Barnett, notes in every case when the Constitution’s framers used the word “commerce”, the “narrowest” construction is employed. The phrase “among the states” referred to trade between states and “regulate” meant “to make regular”. Again, Congress has no authority to make rules governing economic activity in any state whether it crosses state lines or not.21

Professor St. George Tucker, an officer in the Virginia Militia during the War of Independence, and later law professor, wrote the Constitution never authorized the federal government to regulate or interfere with domestic commerce in any way. The Commerce Clause was designed to protect domestic commercial activity from federal interference. States never delegated Congress authority to make rules for any form of economic activity among people, businesses, and states.22 Yet, today, Congress and the Court interpret “to regulate” opposite of its meaning. Justice Clarence Thomas observes the “original meaning” (indicating the current one is in error) of commerce “was limited to the ‘trade and exchange’ of goods and transportation for this purpose”. Courts today have turned this meaning on its head by applying it to “any gainful activity”.23

A common understanding of the Commerce Clause remained consistent throughout the founding era. There is “not a single example from the reports of these proceedings [drafting and ratifying the Constitution] that unambiguously used the broad meaning of commerce, and many instances where the context makes clear that the speaker intended a narrow meaning”.24

Professor Brion McClanahan writes, since Chief Justice John Marshall, who was a strong proponent of a national as opposed to federal system, used Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) to create for Congress a “right to regulate interstate commerce”.25 Marshall had access to founding documents and even spoke in favor of ratification at the Virginia Convention. He knew the meaning and intent of the Commerce Clause. He knew Congress has no authority to regulate private or public economic activities inter or intrastate. But he, like Alexander Hamilton, supported abolishing state governments by consolidating all power in a national government. He ruled, Congress could intervene and make rules for commerce “within a single state” if it affected trade with or in another state.26 In so doing, he overturned the Constitution. From Marbury v. Madison (1803) McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) and subsequent cases, Marshall created from thin air, a new power for Congress rejected to it by the States and Constitution.

Marshall believed the framers meaning and intent for the Commerce Clause was “too narrow”. Congress should have the power to intervene in the economic affairs of state and people. He wrote, “The manner in which the Congress decides to regulate commerce is completely at the discretion of Congress”.27 Of course, he did. Such power would go a long way toward transforming a federal into a national system and destroy state’s reserved powers. Subsequent Courts built precedent on Marshall’s invalid rulings.

For many years they were successfully opposed by Presidents and Governors but, with the passage of time, and for various reasons, Americans began to accept this rewriting of the Constitution and extralegal abolition of the 10th Amendment. Federal Courts ruled Congress could now make laws governing all economic activities within and across state lines if such activities had a “substantial effect (determined by Congress and the Court), on other states. This is an open-ended grant of power because any “activity when taken in the aggregate, could be said to have a ‘substantial effect” on interstate trade. Marshall and subsequent courts eviscerated limits on Congress’s power.28

States created a federal not national government. Through the Constitution, they delegated to it limited and defined powers. They include foreign relations, international trade, war, and standardization of currency, weights and measurements, copyrights, and a postal system. States did not surrender but reserved all other powers to themselves. No federal branch of government, legislative, executive, or judicial, was given the power of judicial review. None has the sole or final authority to interpret the Constitution’s meaning. That right belongs to the people. Consolidationists at the federal convention proposed granting this power to the federal court but delegates voted it down knowing full well States would never ratify the proposed constitution if it contained such a provision. Therefore, the Court has zero authority to rule on the constitutionality of any law, federal or state. The Commerce Clause was written to prohibit states from restricting the free flow of interstate goods through internal tariffs and tolls. Period. Congress has no authority to regulate the economic activities of people, businesses, private or public, within states or because they cross an imaginary line.

How can anyone defend what they know little or nothing about? This amounts to an inexcusable forfeiture on the battlefield. As one who taught government for more than two decades in the public high school system, I am well aware what they teach is an imposter in place of the real Constitution. This is no excuse for conservatives and those claiming to be originalists, to promote the same imposter. After all, I too was taught the false constitution. I took the time to find the real one and others should as well. You may be surprised to discover how far removed, the one taught in public schools, is from the Constitution ratified by the Thirteen States. Hint, no amendments were ever passed to change the intended, and now opposite, meaning of t

11 Richard J. Hardy, Government In America (Boston, Massachusetts, Houghton Mifflin Company, 192), 12.

22 Clarence B. Carson, Basic American Government (Wadley, Alabama, American Textbook Committee, 1996), 500.

33 Yale Law School, Avalon Project, Ratification declarations by States, at https://www.avalon.yale.edu/18th-century/ratsc.ap.

44 John Taylor of Caroline Virginia, New Views of the Constitution of the United States, James McClellan, editor (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1823/2000), 7-8, 20-21, 27, 29, 42-43, 136, 203, 207-213.

55 IBID. 1, 189-190, 255, 257-258, Carson, 40.

66 Harold J. Spaeth & Edward Conrad Smith HarperCollins College Outline: The Constitution of the United States, 13th Edition (New York, N.Y., HarperPerrenial A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 202.

77 Rebecca Brooks Gruver, An American History Volume 1 to 1877, Second Edition (Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1976), 165-174, 184.

88 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison A Biography (Charlottesville, Virginia, University Press of Virginia, 1996), 169-171.

99 Forrest McDonald, Novo Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1998), 18, 266.

1010 Taylor, 328-329.

1111 Edwin Meese III, Matthew Spalding, David Forte, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2005), 107.

1212 IBID. 100.

1313 James Madison, The Federalist Papers , Clinton Rossiter, editor (New York, N.Y., A Mentor Book from New American Library, 1961), 264-268.

1414 IBID. Federalists 42 and 45, 269-269, 293.

1515 Brion McClanahan, The Founding Father’s Guide to the Constitution (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2012), 34-56, 86.

1616 Randy Barnett, “The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause”, The University of Chicago Law Review (Winter 2001), 113-114, at http://www.bu.edu/rbarnett/origins.html.

1717 Madison, 292-293.

1818 Spaeth & Smith, 203.

1919 Barnett, 13-114.

2020 John C. Calhoun, Selected Writings and Speeches, H. Lee Cheek Jr., Editor, (Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), 66-74, 113-114, 272.

2121 Barnett, 112-113, 114-116, 124-125, 142, 146-147.

2222 IBID. 135-136.

2323 IBID. 101-102.

2424 IBID. 112.

2525 McClanahan, Founding Father’s Guide, 50. New York State granted to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a twenty-year monopoly over commercial shipping on rivers within the state. Aaron Ogden operated steam boats out of New Jersey and wanted a piece of the New York trade. He sued in federal court. See Gibbons v. Ogden, Oyez, LII, Supreme Court Resources, Justia, Supreme Court Center at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/22us1.

2626 Thomas E. Woods Jr., and Kevin R.C. Gutzman, Who Killed the Constitution (New York, N.Y., Crown Forum, Random House, Inc., 2008), 106.

2727 Meese, Spalding, and Forte, 101-102.

2828 Woods, Gutzman, 138.

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The Supreme Court of the Public Broadcasting System?

A few days ago, I ran across a column by a Terrence Cummings, “COMMENTARY: But for Rittenhouse doctrine.” It was the usual garbage you’d expect from victim disarmers. I didn’t — at the time — think it worth a response column, but I did write to Cummings.

“But for the Rittenhouse doctrine, you would think you would have a right to take your AR-15 to any grievance or protest near you and across state lines. Then, you could possibly “murder” (used loosely throughout this piece) two people, injure another and call it self-defense.”

Lessee…

1. Rittenhouse didn’t have an AR-15. It was a Smith & Wesson M&P rifle.

2. Rittenhouse didn’t take the rifle across state lines.

3. “Murder” is a specific term best not used “loosely,” unless you enjoyed being sued for libel/defamation. Murder is the deliberate, unjustified killing of a human being by another human being. The general term you are searching for (if you were being honest) is “homicide.”

3a. Rittenhouse fled his first attacker. He fired only when trapped and physically attacked. That is confirmed by video evidence and witness testimony.

3b. Rittenhouse again fled an attacking mod (video & witnesses). He fired again when, laying on the ground, he was again attacked with potential lethal force (the skateboard; if you doubt that’s potentially lethal, ask the family of the Santa Monica man killed by being struck in the head with a skateboard, or check with the California police officer who ended up in ICU when struck with a skateboard by an Antifa protester).

3c. Rittenhouse — still on the ground — fired again at a person who repeated aimed his own unlawfully possessed firearm at Rittenhouse. Video & witnesses.

4. Immediately after the shootings, Rittenhouse fled the pursuing crowd and attempted to turn himself in to the police.

I never made it much past that, since you’d already proved yourself ignorant of federal and state law and the events of the night, and that you are grossly biased.

Cummings’ reply was simple.

Thanks so much for your email and sharing your perspective. It is welcomed and appreciate.

I assumed that was the end of it, until this morning when I received another email from Mr. Cummings. He referred me to another, earlier column he wrote: “COMMENTARY: America worships guns.”

Continue reading The Supreme Court of the Public Broadcasting System?

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More Illegaller In Georgia

Reports indicate that Georgia Dim-ocrats are planning some interesting gun control bills for the next session. I have questions.

Spoiler: Rep Sandra Scott is a Dim-ocrat, from the Atlanta area (District 76). Yes, you can expect stupidity.

Georgia Democrats Plan Gun Control Push in Legislature’s Next Session
Lawmakers plan to introduce bills similar to House bills 962 and 971, which did not advance during this year’s session and would require owners to report lost or stolen firearms and require firearm dealers to furnish gun locks in all retail firearm sales.

Right off, I see a problem. The previous HB 971 (also sponsored by Scott), which this new legislation would seemingly mirror, was rather more than a requirement that firearms dealer provide locks. It was a “secure storage” requirement for gun owners. I’ve noted that other attempts at “safe storage” (i.e.- useless for defense) laws have been fairly carefully written since Heller (2008), which tossed the requirement that firearms be “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock.” The cleverer laws impose liability on a gun owner if an unauthorized person accesses and misuses a firearm. Scott’s 971 would have made “improper” storage a misdemeanor criminal offense whether or not a firearm is accessed, much less if it’s used.

This year’s Bruen ruling also comes into play with this unsafe storage requirement. In that case, the Supreme Court decided that gun control laws must be evaluated, not under intermediate scrutiny (“does it serve a perceived governmental need”) or strict scrutiny (“does it even work”), but under a general historical tradition test that begins with a presumption that Second Amendment rights must be protected.

How exactly does Scott justify so-called “secure storage” of firearms and mandatory reporting of lost or stolen firearms with BRUEN? A few quick searches don’t reveal any general historical tradition of requiring that firearms be stored in an unusable state.

From there, Scott descends into sheer stupidity, or lunacy; you decide.

State Rep. Sandra Scott, D-Rex, said lawmakers are also eying legislation that would prevent Glock owners from turning the guns into automatic weapons.

26 U.S. Code § 5861(a) and 18 U.S. Code § 922(a)(4)make it a felony for any unlicensed person to manufacture (or convert) a machinegun. The Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986 prohibited virtually all manufacture or transfer of mew machineguns. Georgia Code § 16-11-122 and § 16-11-123 likewise already ban possession of machineguns not federally licensed and taxed. Thus, it is, and has been for decades, unlawful for Glock, or any other firearm, owners to covert their firearms into machineguns.

What is the purpose of a new, redundant law outlawing that which is already outlawed, eh, Scott?

She did know this, right? Perhaps her proposed bill will address the issue of criminals who are already ignoring Georgia and federal law.

Ready for more legislative dumbassery?

“We really need to be trying to come up with a way that will restrict kids from being able to go in and purchase weapons…”

“Go in and purchase” suggests that she is speaking of “kids” (minors) purchasing firearms in gun stores. Raise your hands if you see the issue here.

18 U.S. Code § 922 makes it unlawful, a felony, for those under 18 to purchase a firearm from a licensed dealer (and makes it a crime for a dealer to make such a sale). How did Scott miss that? It isn’t something new.

Georgia Code § 16-11-132 makes it unlawful for minor to even possess handguns, with certain exceptions for specified sporting activities under supervision, another long standing restriction that seems to have escaped the Dim-wit’s notice.

I brought these issues to Rep. Scott’s attention. To her credit, and unlike most pols, she actually replied.

Thanks for the information. I will have the legislation reviewed because I am concerned..

It seems to me that the proper time to “review” proposed legislation is before it’s filed or publicly announced, not after people publicly ridicule her ignorance. So forgive me if I think she’s more “concerned” with being outed as a fool (too late!), rather than constitutionality and redundancy.

Sadly, Scott appears to be running unopposed in her solidly Dim district; so there’s no opponent to tip off as to her legislative incompetence.

 

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DC Ammunition Limits: That Didn’t Last Long

Back in July, Dick Heller sued Washington, DC. Again. This time it was over a stupidly arbitrary (or is that arbitrarily stupid?) limit on the amount of ammunition a lawful concealed carrier could carry. This wasn’t even a law or ordinance, but just a nonlegislative “rule” issued by the chief of police.

Given the “general historical tradition” test of Bruen, I figured that was going to get shot right down.

Upon seeing that, I immediately thought of the Militia Act of 1792, which actually specified a minimum amount of ammunition to be carried, not a maximum. And very much more than a single loading of the firearm (also required).

The cesspool city backed down.

Subsection 234.1 is repealed.

The TL;DR is, Umm… given Bruen, we can’t think of any sane way to rationalize our arbitrary capriciousness without getting laughed out of even the lefty DC District Court.

On the downside, if the Court leaves it at that, we miss a judicial precedent saying, Bad dog! No you can’t do that!

On the upside, the silly ammo limit is gone.

For now.

 

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Presumed Guilt In NYC

Somehow, this isn’t at all surprising.

Breaking: Newly Leaked Documents Reveal NYPD Assume Carrying a Firearm Illegal Until Proven Otherwise Despite SCOTUS Ruling
The New York Police Department (NYPD) treats all instances of concealed carry as an illegal act until it can be proven otherwise, according to newly leaked documents obtained by Project Veritas.

New York is playing against a Supreme Court Ruling.

Specifically, they are playing again the very “specific” ruling in Bruen.

In keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.

“Presumptively.” They don’t get to — legally — presume the conduct is unlawful. They — legally — must presume carry is lawful unless and until proven otherwise.

But what else would you expect of constitutionally and judicially ignorant scumbags who also ignored this part…

That said, respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department.

… to declare the city a “sensitive place” piecemeal.

It will soon be forbidden to carry a firearm, even concealed, in the famed Times Square district and other public places in the city and state of New York, authorities announced on Wednesday.

Can someone point me to a citation saying the Supreme Court cannot issue bench warrants for “supreme” contempt of court?

 

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“Voluntary”

Orlando, Florida has a little problem with shootings lately. They have a bigger problem with the Constitution.

Checkpoints. Weapons screening. Metal detectors. On public streets.

Orlando to implement checkpoints downtown after 7 people injured in shooting
In light of the shooting, Dyer said the city will implement checkpoints on weekends. People who want to visit the area of Orange Avenue from Washington to Pine Streets will have to walk through one of six pedestrian checkpoints. This is an example of the city’s most recent controlled access map.

The city said people should expect to see more officers, K9s and metal detectors. There will also be a voluntary weapons screening at the checkpoints.

[…]

While the weapons screening is voluntary, Dyer said he thinks it will make a difference.

“I think if there are people that are carrying weapons and intending to come downtown, they will certainly think twice about that before they do so. I think it’s a deterrent for some people to have to go simply go through a checkpoint,” he said.

Mayor Buddy Dyer tries to rationalize these checkpoints as “voluntary,” but note that he repeatedly stresses that people “have to” go through them.

Where are your warrants, Buddy?

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Or maybe we should look to the Florida constitution.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized,

Possibly Dyer is confused enough to believe that public streets are some sort of sensitive area, rather like the secured portions of airports accessible through TSA checkpoints and metal detectors.

One word, Buddy: Bruen.

For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern regulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said, respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department.

Mayor Dyer did not respond to a request for comment on the constitutional issues with his plan.

Anybody want to take a trip to Orlando to establish standing to sue?

 

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It Begins

Bruen is rolling downhill to lower courts.

In California even. A state court.

The People of the State of California v. Tony Diaz. Diaz was busted for carrying an unregistered handgun without a license. The court cited Bruen and tossed the charges. The state is allowed to file an amended complaint, and — it being California — I assume they will.

At the time of defendant’s arrest California provided one legal means by which an individual could exercise their right to public carry- to get a license under section 26150. That path was unconstitutional. According to Shuttlesworth, faced with an unconstitutional restriction on his constitutional right, defendant was free to engage “with impunity in the exercise of the right. .. ”

The Court does not relish the conclusion reached here and understands its ramifications. But this result cannot be avoided in light of Bruen and Shuttlesworth and the arguments presented by the parties.

The demurrer is SUSTAINED. The People may attempt to remedy the complaint by filing an amended complaint within ten calendar days of the issuance of this order.(§ 1007.) If an amended complaint is not timely filed, the case will be dismissed.

When even California has to take note, we’ve started down the path to freedom again.

 

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Gun Courts And Constitutionality

I ran across an opinion column advocating for a ban of semiautomatic weapons — all of them; not just “assault weapons” — that raised the usual bogus points: The Second Amendment is not an individual right, the National Guard is the militia, no defensive usefulness, and so on.

I could address so many points in that column, but one truly stands above the others.

Why all semi-automatic weapons must be banned on a national basis
“The Constitution expressly allows Congress the right and authority to dictate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. To make sure the will of a majority of U.S. citizens are implemented, Congress could remove from the jurisdiction of the federal courts the ability to rule on the constitutionality of a ban of semi-automatic weapons (similar to the removal of jurisdiction over habeas corpus during the Civil War).”

The author, Bob Reid, is, according to the mini-bio, an attorney who has practiced for 46 years, working on “both state and federal constitutional issues.” That makes his bizarre claim even more incomprehensible.

I have studied the Constitution for decades but that provision still eludes me.

Article III, Section 1.
“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court…”
Section 2.
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution…” (emphasis added)

That would appear to assign jurisdiction over determinations of constitutionality to the courts. As for the suspension of habeas corpus as a pseudo-precedent for limiting the power of the Supreme Court, specifically delegated to the Courts by the Constitution…

Article I, Section 9
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public Safety may require it.” (emphasis added)

Is Reid seriously proposing that Congress declare war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) on the people of the United States, as a means of suspending the Constitution?

And, frankly, citing Lincoln’s abuses of that suspension to imprison his judicial and press critics is bad enough; but the more recent suspension of habeas corpus used for the WW2 internment of thousands of Japanese-American families — including children — is hardly something I would use as justification for more constitutional abuses.

I wrote to Reid, to ask him to cite the constitutional provision which allows this proposed limitation on the Supreme Court. He surprised me by responding.

The Constitution lays out the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but relegates to Congress the unrestricted right to create the judiciary under the Supreme Court, which it has done by creating District Courts and Courts of Appeal. Under this power, Congress can clearly dictate what kind of cases these lower courts can consider (and has exercised this power in the past). If the lower courts are not granted jurisdiction over certain subject matters, and the issue is not part of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, the matter could not make its way to the Supreme Court.

He completely ignores the Article III assignment of jurisdiction for all federal courts, Supreme and inferior, and pretends to find it in the power to institute lower courts. I believe Mr. Reid, apparently primarily a tax attorney, is confusing Article I Tribunals with Article III Courts, and forgetting that tribunals are still “inferior to the supreme Court, just as Article III courts are “such inferior Courts.”

Tribunals are specialized “courts” that Congress can — and has — created for special limited purposes, “administrative courts” such as “tax court.” They are limited in their scope and power compared to Article III Courts.

In theory, Congress could create an ATF “gun court” tribunal responsible for ruling on GCA and NFA charges. But that tribunal — once again — is still “inferior to the Supreme Court” and its rulings would still be subject to Supreme Court review. That means The Supreme Court can still determine whether the tribunal’s acts, and the laws it enforces, are constitutional.

I hope Reid is better at tax law than he is at constitutional law.

He did have one other innovation for his ban; one that avoids the need for a few million door-kicking confiscators (and body bags for them).

These prohibitions should be coupled with a national buy-back program of semi-automatic weapons, but the refusal to sell these weapons or magazines to the government would not itself be a crime. Rather, if a crime is committed using a prohibited weapon or magazine, the owner or immediate seller of such a weapon or magazine would be equally liable for any crime committed with such weapon or magazine, regardless of who pulled the trigger.

So it’s a not a ban. But the criminal use of a semiauto would be a crime.

Hint, Mr.Reid. It already is.

 

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Amicus Brief: Torcivia v. Suffolk County, NY

Via David Codrea, I saw this amicus brief for TORCIVIA v. SUFFOLK COUNTY. It’s an interesting case, for the sheer police-state thuggery involved. The brief summarizes the circumstances.

Try to keep your blood pressure under control.

The defendant police officers testified that Petitioner would “‘yell and scream,’” “‘explode,’” “‘start ranting and raving and screaming….’” Id. at 349-50. That testimony was contradicted by the fact that the Petitioner’s wife remained asleep in the house during the entire encounter with the police. Id. at 349 n.4.

At some point, the police handcuffed Petitioner, and transported him to a hospital for an emergency mental health evaluation, which demonstrated that he was neither a suicide risk nor a risk to others, and recommended he be discharged. Pet. Cert. at 10. Nevertheless, while Petitioner was at the hospital, officers learned from a computer check that Petitioner possessed a New York State pistol license. Id. at 9-10. Although both Petitioner and his wife refused multiple requests for the combination of the firearms safe to facilitate their seizure, eventually Petitioner was coerced by the threat of continued confinement until he provided the combination for his firearms safe. Id. at 11. Officers returned to Petitioner’s home and seized his firearms without a warrant. Id.

I found this part very interesting, for reasons not specific to this case; it’s more of an extension of the amicus argument.

This case represents a growing trend in the lower courts to reduce Fourth Amendment protections when firearms are involved. There is no basis for courts to create various types of firearms exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. It is well established that the exercise of one constitutional right cannot be conditioned upon the forfeiture of another constitutional right.

“It is well established that the exercise of one constitutional right cannot be conditioned upon the forfeiture of another constitutional right.”

the Second Circuit may not use Torvicia’s exercise of that constitutional right to render him vulnerable to government searches and seizures of his firearms which violate Fourth Amendment protections

You can’t violate his privacy and property rights because he chose to exercise his Second Amendment protected right.

And yet, New York already had, even before this unlawful and unconstitutional firearm confiscation.

The state violated Torcivia’s Fourth Amendment rights when they required him to register himself and his pistol before allowing him the “privilege” of exercising the right to keep and bear that pistol. How secure  are your “ persons, houses, papers, and effects” when you have to provide a list of them to the state in get permission to have them.

And this case shows exactly how dangerous forfeiting your privacy is: the state used that no longer private information to steal an innocent man’s property. Registering his exercise of the 2A did “render him vulnerable to government searches and seizures of his firearms.” Torcivia was not “secure” the instant he got a pistol license, and the state used that vulnerability against him.

Any one right does not exist in a vacuum. All constitutionally protected rights are fundamental and individual, and they interact. HELLER Established the the Second Amendment is an individual right. And from NYSRPA v. Bruen:

The exercise of other constitutional rights does not require individuals to demonstrate to government officers some special need. The Second Amendment right to carry arms in public for self defense is no different.

Second Amendment rights are no different than other rights… and Fourth Amendment rights are no different than the Second.

Licensing and registration force one to choose between giving up your constitutional Fourth Amendment right or surrendering your Second Amendment right. At your peril, either way.

 

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